

Excerpts from Wittgenstein *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*

- A. Thus the aim of the book is to set a limit to thought, or rather – not too thought, but to the expression of thoughts: for an order to be able to set a limit to thought, we should have to find both sides of the limit thinkable (i.e., we should be able to think what cannot be thought).
It will therefore only be in language that limits can be set, and what lies on the other side of the limit will simply be nonsense (*T* preface).
- B. 1. The world is all that is the case.
1.1 the world is the totality of facts, not of things.
- C. 2.1 We picture facts to ourselves.
2.12 A picture is a model of reality.
2.131 In a picture the elements of the picture are the representatives of objects
2.14 What constitutes a picture is that its elements are related to one another in a determinate way.
2.141 A picture is a fact.
2.16 If a fact this to be a picture, it must have something in common with what it depicts.
2.161 There must be something identical in a picture and what it depicts, to enable the one to be a picture of the other at all.
2.17 What a picture must have in common with reality, in order to be able to depict it– correctly or incorrectly – in the way it does, is its pictorial form.
2.202 A picture represents a possible situation in logical space.
2.22 What a picture represents it represents independently of its truth or falsity, by means of its pictorial form
2.223 In order to tell whether a picture is true or false we must compare with reality.
2.224 It is impossible to tell from the picture alone whether it is true or false.
2.225 There are no pictures that are true *a priori*
- D. 3 a logical picture of facts is a thought.
3.001 “A state of affairs is thinkable”: what this means is that we can picture it to ourselves.
3.01 the totality of true thoughts is a picture of the world.
3.02 a thought contains the possibility of the situation of which it is the thought. What is thinkable is possible too.
3.1 In a proposition a thought finds an expression that can be perceived by the senses.
3.11 we use the perceptible sign of a proposition (spoken or written, etc.) as a projection of a possible situation.
3.1431 the essence of a propositional sign is very clearly seen if we imagine one composed of spatial objects (such as tables, chairs, and books) instead of written signs. Then the spatial arrangement of these things will express the sense of the proposition.
4.002 Everyday language is a part of the human organism and is no less complicated than that. It is not humanly possible to gather immediately from it what the logic of language is. Language disguises thought.
5.5563 in fact, all the propositions of our everyday language, just as they stand, are in perfect logical order.
- E. 4.003 Most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false but nonsensical. Consequently we cannot give any answer to questions of this kind, but can only establish that they are nonsensical. Most of the propositions and questions of philosophers arise from this failure to understand the logic of our language. . . . And it is not surprising that the deepest problems are in fact not problems at all.
- F. 7. what we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence

Citations:

In-text: (Wittgenstein 2007, 598-614)

Bibliography: Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 2007. *Tractatus Logico Philosophicus* in Norman Melchert. *The Great Conversation*. New York: Oxford University Press.